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Abstract 
 
In contemplating the extent to which rights-based litigation is 
conducive to positive social change, attention ought to be paid 
to the bureaucratic impact of court judgments that vindicate 
rights against the State. As a case study of such impact, this 
article considers the effects of human rights litigation on the 
regulation of informal trade in the City of Johannesburg, where 
a 2013 attempt by local government to clamp down on informal 
trade in the central business district (CBD) led to high-profile 
court action. After describing and problematising the City's 
general approach to managing informal trade, the article focuses 
on "Operation Clean Sweep", which aimed to rid much of the 
CBD of informal traders and became the focal point of rights-
based resistance. It then briefly describes the constitutional and 
jurisprudential framework within which the legal challenge to 
"Operation Clean Sweep" was to be decided, before critically 
discussing the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South 
African Informal Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 
SA 371 (CC), which effectively halted "Operation Clean Sweep" 
by interdicting the City from removing traders from their places 
of business. The article then proceeds to consider the aftermath 
of the judgment, and assesses its impact on the City's informal 
trade policy and urban management practices, as well as on the 
broader regulatory and political environment around street trade 
in South African cities. The article shows that the bureaucratic 
impact of the judgment has, at best, been mixed, and that the 
judgment has not been entirely successful in disrupting the legal 
and bureaucratic mindsets, frameworks and processes that 
simultaneously create, exacerbate and unsuccessfully attempt 
to address the "unmanageability" of street trade in 
Johannesburg. 
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1  Introduction 
One of the main objections typically raised against rights-based judicial 
review, especially in relation to socio-economic rights, is that the policy 
terrain is "polycentric", consisting of an intricate web of interlinked and 
competing interests. It is often argued that court decisions which vindicate 
rights disrupt and disturb this web, and may thereby have unpredictable 
knock-on effects far beyond the immediate context of specific litigation. 
Courts are therefore often cautioned to exercise significant restraint in 
adjudicating polycentric cases.1 
A particularly volatile strand in the polycentric web is that the effect of 
judgments on state bureaucracies is unpredictable.2 This is significant 
because the way in which the State complies with legal judgments against 
it ultimately determines the outcome of rights-based litigation for all of the 
people and embroiled interests concerned, and thereby also affects the 
general utility of rights-based litigation for society.3 
It has been shown that the outcome of successful litigation against the State 
is dependent both on the internal environment within the bureaucracies 
responsible for the implementation of judgments (in that compliance with a 
judgment will depend both on the political will to implement it and on the 
bureaucratic capacity to do so) and on the external political environment 
within which judgments are released and received (in that the nature and 
extent of external political pressures upon bureaucracies will necessarily 
animate their response to a judgment).4 The bureaucratic impact of a 
judgment will therefore also depend on its effect on embroiled social 
movements and pressure groups.5 
This article conducts a case study of such bureaucratic impact in a 
                                            
*  Marius Pieterse. BLC, LLB, LLM (University of Pretoria) PhD (University of the 
Witwatersrand). Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 
South Africa. Email: Marius.Pieterse@wits.ac.za. The research in this article was 
enabled by a grant from the South African National Research Foundation. I am grateful 
to two anonymous referees for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1  Fuller 1978 Harv L Rev 353-409. In the South African context see Liebenberg Socio-
economic Rights 72-75; McLean Constitutional Deference 114-115; Pieterse 2004 
SAJHR 392-395. 
2  See Pieterse Can Rights Cure? 84; Sunkin "Conceptual Issues" 52. 
3  See Gloppen "Social Rights Litigation as Transformation" 162-163. 
4  See Canon "Studying Bureaucratic Implementation" 80; Pieterse Can Rights Cure? 
86-87; Pieterse and Van Donk 2002 LDD 196-197, 207; Rosenberg Hollow Hope 31, 
34, 420; Sunkin "Conceptual Issues" 48, 53, 67-68. 
5  Pieterse Can Rights Cure? 87-88; Rosenberg Hollow Hope 415-419, 425. 
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particularly politically loaded and acutely polycentric context: the regulation 
of informal trade in urban areas in South Africa, with a particular focus on 
the inner city of Johannesburg. 
Throughout the developing world, informal trade poses a headache for local 
governments, who have to balance their obligations to create and sustain 
healthy and safe urban environments conducive to economic growth and 
the sustainment of all urban activities,6 against the fundamental socio-
economic rights of traders, who are often some of the most vulnerable 
members of society. In South Africa, these socio-economic rights are 
constitutionally ensconced and justiciable, with the result that the regulation 
of informality in South African cities is pertinently impacted by their legal 
vindication. 
Due to the precariousness of their businesses, their lack of political clout, 
and a lack of public sympathy for their plight, traders' survival interests are 
often subjugated to urban management concerns. This article grapples with 
the extent to which the legal assertion of rights to a livelihood can make a 
positive difference to the lives of traders in this regard, whilst nevertheless 
allowing for such regulation as is necessary to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the urban environment. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the article focuses not so much on the plight of 
the traders themselves, but rather on the approach and conduct of the 
government that endeavours to manage them. This is in an attempt to better 
understand the concerns and reactions of those whose compliance with the 
obligations imposed by human rights ultimately determines the extent of 
their actual enjoyment. How sympathetic is local government to the 
everyday performance of socio-economic rights and to what extent do these 
rights animate its actions? How does it respond to legal and extra-legal 
attempts to assert rights against it? Can the successful judicial vindication 
of rights against local government make it more sensitive thereto, or does it 
breed hostility, thereby proving counterproductive in the long run? Most 
importantly, what (if any) peculiar features of litigation processes and court 
judgments have a bearing on the answer to these questions? 
The case study conducted here focuses on successful litigation conducted 
on behalf of informal traders in Johannesburg's central business district 
(CBD), which effectively halted "Operation Clean Sweep", a particularly ill-
conceived attempt by the city's Metropolitan Council to clamp down on 
                                            
6  See Pieterse 2014 SAPL 181-184. 
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inner-city informal trade in the last months of 2013. Section 2 below explains 
the historical context of informal trade in the Johannesburg central business 
district and thereafter describes and problematizes the Metropolitan 
Council's stance toward and approach to managing informal trade in the 
city. Thereafter, section 3 describes "Operation Clean Sweep", the reactions 
to it, and informal trader organisations' ultimate resort to litigation in an 
attempt to ameliorate its impact. The judgment of the Constitutional Court 
vindicating the traders' rights is discussed in detail in section 4, before 
section 5 considers the City's response to the judgment, as well as its 
approach to regulating informal trade in its aftermath. The section further 
pays attention to the judgment's impact on informal traders' organisations 
operative in the CBD and to the manner of the City's subsequent 
interactions with them. In the light of what has transpired, section 6 draws 
conclusions about the bureaucratic impact of the litigation in this case, and 
attempts to distill some broader lessons for future attempts at rights-based 
litigation in this context. 
2  The business and management of informal trading in 
Johannesburg 
One of the major developmental challenges facing Johannesburg as a city 
is the very high unemployment rate amongst its residents. Roughly 25% of 
all working-age adults and 31% of employable youth in the city are 
unemployed.7 In the inner city many residents resort to informal self-
employment to make ends meet, selling small quantities of consumer goods 
(sweets, cigarettes, tissues, fruit and vegetables, and so forth) or providing 
informal services (hairdressing, shoe and clothing repair, and such) on 
pavements and in other pedestrian areas. While a crucial livelihood strategy 
and forming an important part of Johannesburg's urban economy,8 the 
proportions of street trade in the inner city pose a significant urban 
management challenge, with already strained urban infrastructure being 
simply unable to cope with the sheer amount and the various byproducts of 
trade, and with pedestrian movement across the city being hampered by the 
associated overcrowding.9 
                                            
7  Statistics South Africa date unknown http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id= 
city-of-johannesburg-municipality. 
8  See Tissington Business of Survival 5-6; Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public Adm 
716-717. There were an estimated 18000 informal traders in the CBD in 2006. 
Tissington Business of Survival 5. 
9  Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public Adm 717. 
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Informal trading was prohibited in the inner city of Johannesburg until shortly 
before South Africa's political transition in the mid-1990s, when the late 
1980s collapse of racist influx control regulations was followed by the 
deregulation of street trade, with the provisions of the Businesses Act 71 of 
1991 allowing for the restriction of such trade only in limited 
circumstances.10 This deregulation came at a tumultuous time for the inner 
city, when a combination of historical factors led to an exodus of established 
businesses from the CBD to newly established suburban commercial 
nodes, and to a concomitant influx of formerly excluded, poor (and often 
formally unemployed) residents from the city's peripheral black townships 
into the increasing number of vacant inner city buildings. The survivalist 
livelihood strategies of many of these residents led to an explosion of 
informal street trading throughout the CBD, with the attendant commotion 
further fuelling the business exodus and contributing to the well-
documented physical degeneration of the inner city environment.11 
The dilapidated state of inner-city Johannesburg became a popular focus 
point for pessimism over governance in the new South Africa, and its 
regeneration and improvement has become a central (albeit not 
uncontested) political priority of the city's local government, motivated not 
only by concern for the CBD's ability to sustain business, livelihoods, 
investment and the like, but also by the inner city's symbolic association with 
its own image.12 A significant portion of the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Council's well-publicised inner city regeneration efforts over the last two 
decades have involved "restoring order" to various features of life in the 
CBD, including the ordering, regulation and formalization of street trade.13 
While initially overwhelmed by the sheer scale and diversity of informal 
livelihood practices in the inner city and responding to these in a "chaotic" 
and piecemeal fashion,14 the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council was the 
first South African local government to formulate a coherent policy response 
                                            
10  Section 6A of the Act is a cumbersome and convoluted provision which prescribes the 
circumstances under which and extent to which municipal bylaws may prohibit and 
restrict informal trade, as well as processes that must be followed to do so. For 
discussion of its initial impact in Johannesburg, see Skinner 2000 Urban Forum 51. 
11  See Murray Taming the Disorderly City 159; Murray City of Extremes 91, 103; 
Tissington Business of Survival 27, 29; Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public Adm 
717. 
12  See Dinath "Between Fixity and Flux" 247; Murray City of Extremes 137; Skinner 2000 
Urban Forum 59. 
13  Dinath "Between Fixity and Flux" 242-244; Makhetha and Rubin "Inner-city Street 
Traders" 532; Murray Taming the Disorderly City 7, 16, 25, 155, 208-210; Tissington 
Business of Survival 5-6, 33-34; Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public Adm 708. 
14  Skinner 2000 Urban Forum 54; Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public Adm 718. 
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to the "problem" of informal trade. Through various iterations, the City's 
policy vision has boiled down to street trade's regulation and formalisation, 
through the designation of areas where trade is either allowed or prohibited, 
the registration ("legalisation") of traders and the prescription of conditions 
for trade. Policy documents have generally professed a "developmental" 
approach to street trade, recognising its importance for the livelihoods of 
residents and its contribution to the economy, but trying to integrate it into 
the "orderly" business activities of the city, not least in order to provide an 
"opportunity ladder" for traders to eventually become subsumed into the 
formal economy.15 
In terms of the 2009 Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg, 
the City's regulation of informal trade centers around the demarcation of 
designated areas for trade and the provision of supporting infrastructure for 
traders who operate there, mostly in the form of linear markets constructed 
by the Johannesburg Development Agency.16 As to traders, the policy 
introduced a smart card registration system, whereby permits for trading in 
designated areas are effectively leased. Only traders with smart cards 
(representing lease agreements) are legally allowed to trade in the city.17 
Administrative implementation of the policy falls on the Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) (which, around the same time as the 
events to be described in section 3 below, became subsumed into the 
Johannesburg Property Company), whereas the enforcement of the related 
municipal trading bylaws (prescribing the manner of trade and its related 
activities, and proscribing trade outside of demarcated areas) mainly befalls 
the City's Metropolitan Police, who are given the authority to dismantle 
"illegal" stalls (ie those outside of designated areas or operated by traders 
without permits) and to remove and impound wares traded "illegally" or in 
contravention of relevant bylaws.18 
While even-handed and fairly progressive on paper, the implementation of 
the Informal Trading Policy has been fraught and inconsistent. Apart from 
generally attempting to steer street trade towards linear markets, the under-
                                            
15  Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 10, 27; Skinner 2000 Urban Forum 65; 
Tissington Business of Survival 17-18; 33-34; Van Rooyen and Malan 2007 J Public 
Adm 717-718. For example, see City of Johannesburg Informal Trading Policy for the 
City of Johannesburg (2009) 3-6. 
16  City of Johannesburg Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2009) 10-
11. 
17  City of Johannesburg Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2009) 12-
15. 
18  City of Johannesburg Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2009) 19-
20. 
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resourced MTC has proved to be administratively ill-equipped to manage 
the everyday intricacies thereof. Accordingly, it has partly (and unofficially) 
outsourced much of this management to the private sector across the CBD's 
patchwork of "City Improvement Districts", while its own management 
efforts in the areas in between have been inconsistent. The result has been 
that the Metropolitan Police's bylaw enforcement efforts have become the 
face of street trade management across much of the CBD.19 The City has 
also been slow with the construction of linear markets and the provision of 
associated trading infrastructure, with the result that the demand for trading 
space far outstrips the supply, and even in demarcated areas the 
infrastructure is often inadequate to support the activities. The traders also 
complain about the limited number and impractical location of the 
demarcated areas, which are often distant from the most passing foot-traffic. 
Moreover, the roll-out of the smart card and lease agreement system has 
been incomplete, inconsistent, inefficient and replete with tales of 
corruption, with the result that not all traders have been willing or able to 
comply with the system. Finally, the Metropolitan Police's manner of bylaw 
enforcement, especially against "illegal" traders, has been problematic. 
Tales of corruption and intimidation in the everyday course of enforcement 
are legion, and a great many traders complain of (often physical) 
harassment, extortion and the unwarranted confiscation and destruction of 
goods.20 
While often simply ascribed to a lack of enforcement capacity and resource 
scarcity, these implementation problems are arguably far more structural, 
and relate to the manner in which law and related exercises of state power 
actively produce illegality and informality.21 Rooted in the very desire to 
"formalise" and "regulate" street trade (which, of course, is by its nature fluid 
and informal), the policy framework's creation of an artificial category of 
"legal" (formalised, regulated) street trade, distinguishable from its "illegal" 
counterpart only through (often arbitrary and outwardly invisible) 
bureaucratic compliance (the possession of lease agreements and smart 
cards, its presence in designated areas, compliance with obscure bylaws 
                                            
19  Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 12-13, 57-58, 65-66; Horn Collective 
Bargaining 3; Webster "The End of the Street?" 4, 28-29. 
20  On these and other implementation problems, see Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for 
Sustainable Models 20, 36-37, 60; Dinath "Between Fixity and Flux" 243-244; 
Makhetha and Rubin "Inner-city Street Traders" 532, 536; Murray Taming the 
Disorderly City 229, 233; Tissington Business of Survival 6, 19-20, 39, 55-63; Webster 
"The End of the Street?" 24-29, 45-46. 
21  See especially Roy 2005 J Am Plann Assoc 149-150; 155-156, also Benit-Gbaffou In 
Quest for Sustainable Models 15, 62-63; Schraten 2013 Anthropology SA 108, 111, 
113-114. 
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and so forth), taints and threatens the entire informal trading sector with (at 
least potential) illegality and its dire, livelihood-restricting consequences.22 
The simultaneous limitation of opportunities for "legal" trade (through, for 
instance, designating only limited space for trade, issuing only a limited 
number of smart cards, and entering only into a limited number of lease 
agreements) creates scarcity and competition in an otherwise limitless 
marketplace, thereby fostering urgency and contestation and creating 
opportunities (and the need) for concealment, transgression, 
misrepresentation and corruption.23 Much like the similarly artificial 
distinction between "legal" and "illegal" foreign migrants (with which the 
"legal"/"illegal" trader distinction volatilely intersects, as briefly elaborated 
below), the result is a tangle of real and perceived legal compliance and 
non-compliance, which proves near unmanageable by however well-
resourced and sophisticated an implementation system. 
The internalisation and constant negotiation of this tangle by traders 
themselves makes for a somewhat volatile and conflicted inner-city trading 
environment characterised by divisions and mistrust, much as it is united by 
a common quest for sustainable livelihoods. Several traders' organisations, 
with different levels of internal formal structures and representing different 
subgroups of traders, are active in the CBD.24 Not only do these 
organisations sometimes advance competing interests, but they also 
compete in attempts to influence the City's general approach to informal 
trade in the CBD. For instance, organisations representing "legal" traders 
often campaign for stronger law enforcement against "illegal" ones, because 
of resentment of the fact that "illegal" traders are able to trade at a lesser 
operating cost and in more business-conducive locations.25 In line with the 
severely xenophobic attitudes prevalent amongst Johannesburg's poorer 
residents more broadly, South African-born traders and some trader 
organisations are further often hostile to (often "illegal") trade by foreign 
nationals, and argue that more explicit preference must be given to locals 
in the allocation of stalls and the enforcement of bylaws.26 
While the relationship between street traders and City management could 
                                            
22  See Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 11; 20, 60-63; Webster "The End 
of the Street?" 23-24. 
23  See Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 13, 20, 60-62, 83-84; Schraten 
2013 Anthropology SA 111-114; Webster "The End of the Street?" 5, 35, 62, 66. 
24  For a detailed overview of these, see generally Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape. 
Also see Tissington Business of Survival 43-47. 
25  See Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 6, 110-111; Makhetha and Rubin "Inner-city 
Street Traders" 536-537; Webster "The End of the Street?" 34. 
26  See Tissington Business of Survival 54-59. 
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not be described as convivial, the majority of the traders have generally 
accepted the need for the regulation of their industry and have tried to 
conduct their business in accordance with the demands of the regulatory 
framework. Indeed, traders have often expressed frustration at the lack of 
consistent and predictable enforcement of regulations and at the City's 
failure to comply with its undertakings in terms of the policy, especially in 
relation to the provision of the necessary infrastructure, support and 
administrative systems.27 
Engagement channels between the traders and the City, while in existence 
and relatively functional, have fallen short of addressing these concerns and 
of enabling consistent and meaningful implementation of the City's trade 
policies and bylaws. The MTC has generally attempted to be open and 
responsive to traders' concerns, and to provide official channels for 
engaging with traders' organisations. Street traders were identified as 
stakeholders in the inner city (alongside, for instance, the Johannesburg 
Property Owners' Association, the Johannesburg Inner City Business 
Coalition and the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and 
were accordingly included in the "Partnership Forum" set up in terms of the 
2007 Inner City Regeneration Charter28 and continuing under its successor, 
the 2013 Inner City Transformation Roadmap.29 Furthermore, an Informal 
Trader Forum facilitated by the City's Department of Economic 
Development also met regularly, although many traders experienced this as 
more of a "top-down" structure dominated by the City's urban management 
agenda, rather than a genuine forum for dialogue.30 Moreover, the manner 
of the City's engagement in these fora sometimes fueled and exploited 
existing conflict and divisions between traders' organisations, in what could 
be seen as a rather cynical "divide and rule" tactic insulating the City's 
agenda from meaningful opposition.31 
Outside of these fora, attitudes towards street trade within the Metropolitan 
Council and the various city management agencies have generally tended 
to be negative. While there are important voices within the City (emanating, 
for instance, from the Johannesburg Development Agency) in favour of the 
vibrancy and economic contribution of street trade, in line with a "place-
making" approach to urban regeneration and an emphasis on urban 
                                            
27  Webster "The End of the Street?" 32-33, 36-38. 
28  See City of Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration Charter (2007) 53-54. 
29  See City of Johannesburg Inner City Transformation Roadmap (2013) 70-71. 
30  See Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 8; Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable 
Models 27, 88; Horn Collective Bargaining 3-4. 
31  Horn Collective Bargaining 3. 
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inclusivity, the majority of officials in a decision-making capacity tend to view 
street trade as a disorderly scourge requiring strict regulation, in line with a 
modernist, top-down, "broken window" approach to urban management and 
regeneration fixated on urban aesthetics, which has tended to hold sway 
within the City.32 This has meant that, even in the face of the clear practical 
shortcomings of its restrictive, linear-market focused "solution" to the 
"problem" of street trade, the City has doggedly persisted therewith, while 
managing the "spillover" from markets mainly through bylaw enforcement in 
the problematic manner described above.33 
In the light of the inconsistencies in street trade management across the 
CBD, the limited resources at the City's disposal and the policy framework's 
complicity in the creation of a perpetually unmanageable problem of "illegal" 
trade, such bylaw enforcement has more often than not taken the form of 
Metropolitan Police-fronted "blitzes" aiming to "stamp out" illegal trade. 
Criticised for being shortsighted and unsustainable, and for unacceptable 
accompanying levels of police brutality, these "blitzes" have unfortunately 
also become a stalwart of the City's approach to various other urban 
management issues. The reasons for this include the political expediency 
of being seen to be "doing something" high-profile about urban 
management issues and the concomitant need to make a visible (albeit 
inevitably short-term) impact on the urban environment within a limited 
budget, something which also tends to align with the performance goals of 
individual City employees.34 
Overall, the relationship between the City and the traders that animate the 
streets of the central business district could at best be described as a volatile 
truce, always subject to disruption in the City's overarching quest to 
"restore" order and predictability to the inner city. Traders, meanwhile, make 
their living under fairly precarious conditions, even while many attempt, as 
                                            
32  See Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 11; Dinath "Between Fixity and 
Flux" 248-249; Makhetha and Rubin "Inner-city Street Traders" 533-534; Murray 
Taming the Disorderly City 25, 227, 229; Tissington Business of Survival 6; Webster 
"The End of the Street?" 53. A critique of the prevailing modernist approach, 
epitomised for instance by "world class city" discourse, is beyond the scope of this 
article. Suffice it to say that targeting aesthetics without also addressing underlying 
structural inequalities and economic hardship is bound to be an exercise in futility. See 
Roy 2005 J Am Plann Assoc 149-150; Webster "The End of the Street?" 6, 43, 58, 66. 
33  Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 10-11, 20; Webster "The End of the 
Street?" 6, 51-52. 
34  For discussion and criticism of the City's "blitz mentality", see Dinath "Between Fixity 
and Flux" 245-249; Murray Taming the Disorderly City 227, 229, 233; Webster "The 
End of the Street?" 53-54. 
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far as is possible, to do so within the confines of regulation. 
3  "Operation Clean Sweep" 
A particularly egregious manifestation of the City's "blitz approach" to 
managing informality in the CBD, the so-called "Mayoral Clean Sweep," was 
conceived in mid-2013 as a crackdown on illegal informal trade in the inner 
city, which was once again perceived to be getting out of control. Planned 
for implementation from September 2013 onwards, the operation was 
mooted to involve the removal of all "illegal" traders from the city's streets 
as part of a broader "cleanup" operation also including a range of cosmetic 
improvements to the urban environment. Ideologically problematic for its 
grouping of "illegal" traders together with non-human forms of "dirt" to be 
eradicated from the streets,35 the mooted Operation Clean Sweep 
nevertheless had the initial support not only of business and other inner city 
stakeholders, but also of prominent traders' organisations in the city, who 
had long been lobbying for stricter law enforcement against their "illegal" 
counterparts.36 
Commencing in early October 2013, the implementation of Operation Clean 
Sweep was immediately under fire from various quarters, however, mostly 
(once again) for the brutal and violent manner in which the Metropolitan 
Police were carrying out the operation.37 The City, in response, condemned 
these actions but emphasised the need to counter the "chaos" that was 
reigning on the streets, ostensibly because of informal trade.38 
But more was to come. In a bizarre turn of events, implementing officials 
faced with the artificial distinction between legal and illegal traders and a 
seemingly disproportionate number of falsified or fraudulently issued 
permits and smart cards decided to deal with their resulting inability to 
distinguish the targets of the operation by removing all traders, even those 
who were patently "legal", from the streets and to confiscate their wares. 
Amidst a widespread outcry and after tense negotiations the City entered 
into an agreement with legal traders, in terms of which a permit and smart-
                                            
35  Beyleveld Regulating Informal Trade in Johannesburg 18; Webster "The End of the 
Street?" 53-54. 
36  Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 6. 
37  See Beyleveld Regulating Informal Trade in Johannesburg 18-19 and authorities cited 
there; also Nxumalo 2013 http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-01-police-proud-of-work-
around-inner-city-clean-up. 
38  See Cox 2013 http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/cbd-clean-sweep-1394105; Nxumalo 
2013 http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-01-police-proud-of-work-around-inner-city-
clean-up. 
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card "re-verification" exercise would immediately commence, and in terms 
of which "verified" legal traders would be allowed to return to their trading 
spots. However, throughout the following week it transpired that not even 
duly verified traders were being allowed back on the streets while the 
process was ongoing, and that the City's ultimate intention was to 
permanently deny permission to trade to a large number of formerly "legal 
traders", whereas others would be "permanently relocated". Meanwhile, a 
great many livelihoods were effectively extinguished, countless families 
were left without income, and both the informal and formal economy in the 
city (which were interconnected in more subtle and intricate ways than was 
understood at the time) took a severe knock.39 
As communication between the City and traders increasingly broke down 
and the socio-economic impact of Operation Clean Sweep intensified, 
desperate traders' organisations turned to the law. The South African 
Informal Traders Forum (SAITF), overwhelmingly representing "legal" 
traders, approached the Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI), a legal 
NGO conducting litigation, research and advocacy mostly in relation to inner 
city housing in Johannesburg, for assistance. Deciding to proceed on behalf 
of all "legal" traders who had been removed by the City in contravention of 
its own bylaws, the Informal Trade Policy and the provisions of the 1991 
Businesses Act, SERI proceeded to launch legal action in the Johannesburg 
High Court, applying for an order declaring Operation Clean Sweep unlawful 
and for an interim interdict requiring its immediate cessation pending the 
litigation. 
Bafflingly, the Johannesburg High Court dismissed the application for the 
interim interdict, because the presiding judge felt that the matter was not 
urgent (and, effectively, that street trade could remain prohibited until such 
time as the challenge to the legality of Operation Clean Sweep was heard 
some months later).40 This order was urgently appealed to the Constitutional 
Court, which granted leave to appeal and heard the matter on 5 December, 
by which time many traders had been without income for nearly 2 months. 
                                            
39  This exposition of events follows the "background summary" provided by the 
Constitutional Court in South African Informal Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg 
2014 4 SA 371 (CC) paras 6-10. Also see Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 6; 
Nxumalo 2013 http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-01-police-proud-of-work-around-inner-
city-clean-up; Webster "The End of the Street?" 14, 16, 24. 
40  Order of the South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg) in South African Informal 
Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg (GJ) unreported case number 43427/13 of 27 
November 2013. Also see SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 
13; Webster "The End of the Street?" 17. 
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4  The Constitutional Court judgment in South African 
Informal Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg 
The Constitutional Court granted the requested interim interdict on the day 
of the hearing, ordering that the City was not allowed to interfere with trading 
by the applicants (members of SAITF, as well as other "legal" traders) at the 
locations that they had occupied prior to their removal in the course of 
Operation Clean Sweep.41 In other words, the Court ordered that traders 
could return to their allocated stalls immediately, and could not be removed 
pending a final decision on the legality of the operation. The judgment thus 
clearly ordered that the implementation of Operation Clean Sweep, at least 
as far as informal traders were concerned, had to stop immediately. 
The Court provided written reasons for its judgment a few months later. 
While acknowledging that Operation Clean Sweep impacted on a number 
of interrelated constitutional rights, notably the rights to dignity (understood 
as encompassing a right to a livelihood), freedom of trade, and the basic 
socio-economic rights of children,42 the Court's focus in the written 
judgement was on the simple fact of the illegality of the City's actions. This 
was because there was no dispute that the City had been acting in 
contravention of its own policies and bylaws, as well as of the provisions of 
the Businesses Act (simply because, by the City's explicit admission, it was 
"convenient" for it to do so),43 which means that its actions were clearly 
illegal and that the "legal" traders had an "undisputed right" to occupy their 
designated trading spots.44 Given this "undisputed right", the clear and 
irreparable harm suffered by the traders who were left destitute by the City's 
illegal actions (and would remain so for at least 3 further months if an 
interdict were not granted), the fact that the balance of convenience clearly 
favoured the traders, and that no other effective remedy was available to 
them in the circumstances,45 the Court could thus issue a straight-forward, 
common-law interdict without the need to conduct a constitutional rights-
based inquiry. 
While sensible and understandable, this sidestepping of a more profound 
contemplation of traders' constitutional rights means that the judgment 
                                            
41  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 1. 
42  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 31. Also see para 11. 
43  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) paras 26-28. 
44  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 25. Indeed, the Court felt that 
the City was so obviously in the wrong that it was unlikely that Operation Clean Sweep 
would ultimately be declared to have been legally permissible in the High Court. SAITF 
v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 28. 
45  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) paras 21, 24, 29-30, 36-37. 
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provided little clarity on the extent to which the implicated rights would assist 
traders in similar future disputes, especially in instances where the City does 
act within the parameters of the law, or acts only against "illegal" traders, as 
was its initial intention during "Operation Clean Sweep". At the time of the 
judgment, the state of constitutional jurisprudence suggested that 
constitutional protection for informal trade beyond the boundaries of the 
Businesses Act and associated bylaws might be scant. Section 22 of the 
1996 Constitution, which guarantees the right to choice of trade, occupation 
or profession, is explicitly limited to South African citizens and expressly 
subjected to legal regulation. In Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
Health,46 the Constitutional Court confirmed that, unless unconstitutional for 
some other reason, legislative or policy-based restrictions on trade which 
are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and adhere to the 
basic tenets of the legality principle would therefore not ordinarily fall foul of 
the right. 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka47 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that, notwithstanding the limits to the right to trade, blanket restrictions 
on the right to seek formal employment would fall foul of the right to dignity 
where they have the effect of rendering someone completely destitute and 
unable to fend for themselves. But the impact of this ruling was clawed back 
by the Constitutional Court's subsequent finding, in Union of Refugee 
Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority,48 that 
restrictions on particular kinds of employment did not unjustifiably limit the 
right to dignity (and that it was therefore not unconstitutional to prohibit 
refugees from working as security guards, much as their other realistic 
employment options were limited). 
While unequivocally vindicating the legal rights of the traders against the 
City, and more than once expressing dissatisfaction with the City's callous 
disregard for the law and its cynical approach to the traders,49 the Court in 
the SAITF matter was not entirely unsympathetic to the City's plight. It 
acknowledged the objectives behind Operation Clean Sweep (namely, as 
stated by the Court, to "rid the City of unsightly and disorderly trading areas" 
which allegedly "gave rise to disorderliness, criminality and obstruction of 
                                            
46  Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC). See paras 62-
72, 77, 92-94, 100, 105. Also see Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 468; 
Pieterse Can Rights Cure? 138. 
47  Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 1 All SA 21 (SCA) paras 27, 29-33. 
48  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
2007 4 SA 395 (CC) paras 52; 54; 57; 66-67. 
49  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) paras 26-28, 33-34, 36. 
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citizens' right to the proper use and enjoyment of facilities in and around 
trading areas") and referred to these as "laudable".50 This would seem to 
indicate that, in line with its finding in Affordable Medicines Trust, the Court 
regarded trade-related bylaw enforcement as being rationally connected to 
a legitimate government purpose and that it would therefore be in order for 
the City to restrict traders' rights in the course of enforcing these bylaws. 
However, in the case of Operation Clean Sweep the Court regarded these 
objectives as irrelevant, seeing that the City "had gone about achieving its 
objectives in flagrant disregard of the traders' [legal] rights".51 The Court 
thus signaled that it was not so much the objectives of Operation Clean 
Sweep but rather the manner of its implementation which it regarded as 
untenable.52 
Moreover, the Court indicated in more than one instance that the harm of 
the manner of the implementation of Operation Clean Sweep lay in its failure 
to distinguish between legal traders (whose rights to trade were 
"undisputed") and illegal ones, going so far as to emphasise that "it is open 
to the City to use all lawful means to combat illegal trading and other criminal 
conduct" provided that it does not "cause harm to lawful, if not vulnerable, 
traders".53 This underscored not only the strategic wisdom of bringing the 
lawsuit only on behalf of legal traders,54 but also indicated that it was non-
compliance with ordinary law, rather than with the Court's understanding of 
the implicated constitutional rights, that undergirded the granting of the 
interdict. The emphasis on lawfulness further meant that the Court failed to 
consider the impact of the City's policy framework's initial designation of 
certain kinds of trade as "illegal" on the rights of those whose livelihood-
generating activities are effectively criminalised thereby.55 
This said, it would be difficult to characterise the SAITF judgment as 
amounting to anything other than a disdainful rejection of the manner in 
which the City had conducted itself during the course of Operation Clean 
Sweep, and an unequivocal affirmation of the dignity of street traders in the 
face of unwarranted and brutal exercises of State power. Furthermore, the 
                                            
50  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 7. See also para 32.  
51  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 7. See also para 32. 
52  For a similar argument, see Beyleveld Regulating Informal Trade in Johannesburg 6, 
21. 
53  SAITF v City of Johannesburg 2014 4 SA 371 (CC) para 33. Also see paras 4-7. 
54  Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 6-7. 
55  This is in line with the Court's finding in S v Jordan 2002 6 SA 642 (CC) paras 23-26 
that the criminalisation of sex work, being rationally connected to the legitimate 
government purpose of promoting the "quality of life", did not infringe the right to 
freedom of trade. 
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clear and unambiguous terms of the Court's order made it impossible to 
evade its ultimate message: Operation Clean Sweep, at least in its current, 
illegal iteration, was over. 
5  The regulation of informal trade in Johannesburg, in 
the aftermath of the judgment 
On the afternoon of 5 December 2013, with that morning's Constitutional 
Court judgment in hand, traders began to return to the streets of the 
Johannesburg CBD. Understandably, there were immediate clashes with 
the Metropolitan Police, who had not yet heard of the judgment and who 
thus viewed the traders' attempts to set up shop again as defiance of 
Operation Clean Sweep. Several traders, as well as one of SERI's lawyers, 
who tried to communicate the terms of the judgment to the police, were 
arrested and manhandled.56 
Once news of the judgment made it down the Metropolitan Police's chain of 
command, however, there was begrudging compliance with the judgment. 
Over the course of the next few weeks, traders returned to the streets in 
large numbers. Importantly, these were not only the "legal" traders who had 
been the applicants in the litigation and at whom the Court's order was 
directed, but also the scores of "illegal" traders who had "legitimately" been 
removed during the course of Operation Clean Sweep.57 The judgment's 
immediate impact thus extended far more broadly than the confines of the 
Court's order. Generally welcomed for its obvious humanitarian and broader 
social justice benefits, this unintended feature of the judgment was 
nevertheless a hard blow for the City, since it meant that even the 
(admittedly few) legitimate aspects of Operation Clean Sweep had been 
derailed. 
For the City there was thus no other option but to return to the drawing 
board. The Council's Department of Economic Development took stock of 
the judgment and set out to frame a new policy on informal trade in the CBD, 
which it explicitly intended to comply with the SAITF judgment but also to 
address all of the problems that it had previously experienced with 
unmanaged street trade, which it still viewed as a scourge.58 Remaining 
                                            
56  See SERI 2013 http://www.seri-sa.org/images/SAITF_Press_release_ 
5Dec2013_final.pdf. 
57  Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 6-7. Also see City of Johannesburg Proclamation 
of Restricted Trading Areas and Designation of New Trading Areas in the City of 
Johannesburg (Mayoral Committee Meeting Notes: Department of Economic 
Development, 20 March 2014) 32.10 (hereafter "Mayoral Committee Meeting Notes"). 
58  Mayoral Committee Meeting Notes 3-7. Also see Webster "The End of the Street?" 
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unflinchingly committed to the distinction between "legal" and "illegal" 
traders, the prohibition of trade in many portions of the CBD and the 
enforcement of bylaws, the Department indicated, in documents for a 
meeting of the Johannesburg Mayoral Committee, that both the principle 
and the implementation of new policy would comply with the terms of the 
SAITF judgment and with the letter of applicable laws, not least so as to 
enable the City to successfully defend itself against future litigation that 
might arise.59 The Department further noted that the Constitutional Court 
judgment "has not precluded the City in enforcing its bylaws" and 
accordingly committed the Metropolitan Police to step up such enforcement 
within the limits of the law, including provisions such as those on the 
enforcement and collection of fines and on the verification of the immigration 
status of foreign traders in conjunction with the Department of Home Affairs, 
which had previously not been zealously enforced.60 
The City's new "implementation framework" for its trading policy was 
formally adopted in May of 2014. Clearly in line with the provisions of the 
Businesses Act and with the SAITF judgment, this policy document 
encouragingly envisaged the accommodation of a larger number of "legal" 
traders than previously, and committed the City to increasing the number of 
areas in the CBD designated for informal trade and to providing the 
necessary enabling infrastructure.61 Yet its underlying logic remained one 
of the prohibition and restriction of trade, meaning that the structural flaws 
of previous policy frameworks remained unaddressed.62 Unsurprisingly, 
then, despite the pursuant designation of additional areas for street trade in 
early 2015, the policy's implementation as well as the Metropolitan Police's 
enforcement of the related by-laws remained fraught with all of the same 
problems experienced before, with some indications that the SAITF 
judgment had actually had the effect of increasing police officers' hostility 
towards traders.63 
                                            
48-49. 
59  Mayoral Committee Meeting Notes 10. Also see Webster "The End of the Street?" 48-
50. 
60  Mayoral Committee Meeting Notes 10. 




62  Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 11, 82-83; Webster "The End of the 
Street?" 50. 
63  See Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 79-80; Myambo 2014 
http://www.theconmag.co.za/2014/10/08/joburgs-street-traders-swept-into-a-corner/; 
Webster "The End of the Street?" 50. 
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The judgment further did not alter the City's "blitz approach" to managing 
trade and other instances of informality, though subsequent blitzes did 
appear to have an increased basis of legality. For instance, in early 2015 
the City launched "Operation KeMolao" [Operation "it is the law"], involving 
a number of blitz-like removals of traders at intersections. While decried by 
social justice advocates,64 this operation, which was carried out in strict 
adherence to relevant road traffic bylaws, went legally unchallenged.  
Within Johannesburg's local government, then, apart from small 
concessions towards a more progressive, "place-making" approach to trade 
management in internal policy documents, the only lesson clearly learnt 
from the SAITF judgment was the obvious one: that the City should operate 
within the confines of the law when acting in pursuit of its policy objectives. 
Certainly, the attitude of most officials towards informal traders has at best 
not changed and, at worst, has hardened, while there remains an unaltered 
commitment to accomplish all previous policy goals with as little 
consideration for the interests of individual traders as before, although now 
within the limits of the law (meaning that efforts are now for a large part also 
more resistant to legal challenge). Given the SAITF judgment's lack of 
engagement with the substantive constitutional legitimacy of the City's 
policy objectives and its fixation on adherence to the legality principle, this 
was perhaps to be expected. 
As to the traders, the judgment certainly energised the SAITF and increased 
its clout in the eyes of other traders and traders' organisations in the city. It 
also appears that traders' organisations have become better organised in 
the wake of the litigation and are increasingly aware of the extent to which 
rights and the law can be used, through partnering with organisations such 
as the SERI, to further their aims. Most significantly, traders organisations 
in Johannesburg report that City officials are treating them with more 
respect, albeit begrudgingly, and appear to be taking their views more 
seriously in the course of interactions.65 
However, this increased respect has been accompanied also by increased 
circumspection on the part of City officials, and by a measure of a 
breakdown in trust between them and the traders' organisations. In 
particular, the City appears to resent the SAITF's relationship with the SERI, 
against whom there is significant hostility across all official governance 
                                            
64  See Webster 2015 http://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-16-clean-sweep-of-the-poor-is-not-
constitutional. 
65  See Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 7, 110-112. 
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structures in Johannesburg.66 The judgment also negatively impacted the 
already beleaguered communication channels between the City and the 
traders. Former engagement structures such as the Informal Traders Forum 
were abandoned after the judgment,67 and the City now negotiates with 
traders only within the formalized confines of legally required consultation 
processes. In the course of these, it has been reported that the City now 
insists on always having its lawyers present and is far less open to 
negotiation and compromise over its day-to-day management of informal 
trade than was previously the case.68 The result is that traders' 
organisations feel that their input into the formulation of the 2014 trade 
implementation framework and subsequent policy initiatives has been 
superficial at best, and that they have largely been sidelined when it comes 
to the execution of policies.69 
The SAITF litigation and judgment has thus clearly further politicised the 
external environment of informal trade in Johannesburg. On the one hand, 
the formal negotiation power of traders' organisations within this 
environment has been visibly enhanced and their rights-consciousness, as 
well as their readiness to resort to legal avenues to enforce their rights, has 
been increased. On the other hand, city officials have hardened their stance 
to traders in return, and have extended their "to-the-letter-of-the-law" 
approach to managing street trade in the aftermath of the judgment with a 
similar approach to engaging with traders, to the ostensible detriment of 
participatory democracy in the city. 
Whereas SAITF did little to shift the overall bureaucratic approach to 
informal trade in Johannesburg, two subsequent judgments from elsewhere 
in the country have arguably added constitutional impetus to calls for such 
a shift. First, in Somali Association of South Africa v Limpopo Department 
of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism70 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal found that the Limpopo Provincial Government's implementation 
of the so-called "Operation Hardstick" (which was eerily similar to Operation 
Clean Sweep in its intention to stamp out illegal trade, but was accompanied 
                                            
66  See Charlton "Public Housing in Johannesburg" 189. This hostility stems from the 
SERI's regular resort to litigation against the City in challenging evictions from inner-
city buildings in pursuit of inner city regeneration. 
67 See Benit-Gbaffou In Quest for Sustainable Models 87-88; Horn Collective Bargaining 
5. 
68  Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 7-8, 114. 
69  Benit-Gbaffou Political Landscape 8, 194; Webster "The End of the Street?" 10, 28, 
53. 
70  Somali Association of South Africa v Limpopo Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism 2015 1 SA 151 (SCA). 
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by a bureaucratic refusal to award trade permits to foreign nationals, hence 
rendering all foreign informal traders in Limpopo "illegal" and thus subject to 
removal) was "unacceptable and contrary to constitutional values".71 
Elaborating on its earlier judgment in Watchenuka, the Court found that the 
refusal of trade permits to foreign nationals effectively rendered them 
destitute by precluding them from engaging in self-employment, and thereby 
infringed their right to dignity.72 While (like SAITF) the Somali Association 
judgment endorses the regulation of informal trade in conformance with 
prevailing laws, it does suggest that the effective criminalization of essential 
livelihood-sustaining practices through the inflexible implementation of a 
regulatory framework may be constitutionally problematic. 
Secondly, in Makwickana v eThekwini Municipality73 the Durban High Court 
found that the City of Durban's trade bylaws were unconstitutional to the 
extent that they allowed for the impounding and confiscation of "legal" 
traders' goods without due process.74 The eThekwini municipality was 
accordingly ordered to pay compensation to a permit-holding informal trader 
whose wares had been impounded and subsequently disposed of by the 
police.75 While again accepting and affirming the legitimacy of the regulation 
of informal trade,76 the Court found that bylaws had to be enforced in a 
manner that was least restrictive of traders' rights, and that they had to 
provide for engagement and dispute resolution mechanisms.77 
Perhaps inspired by the Makwickana decision, the SERI announced in late 
2016 that it had instituted a damages claim to the tune of R120 million 
against the City of Johannesburg to compensate traders illegally removed 
during Operation Clean Sweep for the value of the goods illegally 
impounded and for loss of income.78 
                                            
71  Somali Association of South Africa v Limpopo Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism 2015 1 SA 151 (SCA) para 44. 
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6  Conclusion 
Few would contest the fact that the SAITF judgment had a much needed, 
instantly positive effect on the lives of informal traders in Johannesburg, 
whose ability to make a livelihood it quite literally and immediately restored. 
As such, it is a textbook example of the protectionist effect of rights-based 
litigation at its best – putting a stop to a flagrantly illegal abuse of public 
power against a vulnerable and marginalised section of society. As such, 
the outcome of the case underlines that, for all its potential drawbacks, 
judicial intervention in the implementation of policy has the clear advantage 
of being able to cut through layers of bureaucratic red tape, internal politics 
and official opposition to ensure that rights and the law are immediately 
upheld.79 
Moreover, SAITF clearly illustrates that the direct and indirect benefits of 
litigation often extend beyond the specific applicants in a matter and can be 
felt beyond the confines of a particular case. The judgment has certainly 
advanced the cause of both "legal" and "illegal" traders in Johannesburg 
and other South African cities by at the very least indicating that their 
concerns ought to be taken seriously and their legal rights respected when 
conceiving of and implementing policies aimed at their "management". 
SAITF was, of course, an easy case to contest. Due to the City's patent and 
wayward disregard for the law it was an almost sure win, resulting virtually 
automatically from a straight-forward application of statutory and common 
law, without any real need for the court to engage in the intricate balancing 
of the rights of the traders against the City's urban management objectives. 
The question remains, however, whether rights-based litigation would have 
been able to assist the traders as powerfully had the rule of law been 
observed by the relevant authorities.80 In this respect, the significant margin 
of regulatory discretion awarded by the SAITF Court to the City, as well as 
the Court's apparent endorsement, in principle, of the City's urban 
management objectives, appears to indicate the contrary. 
Indeed, the understandable elevation of the legality principle in SAITF and 
related case law serves to obscure, and arguably entrench, the complicity 
of the law and attendant regulatory frameworks in producing "illegality", by 
unquestioningly endorsing various legal restrictions on trade. As a result, 
much as it has enhanced the observance of the rule of law and has indirectly 
                                            
79  On this positive effect of rights-based adjudication, see Dixon 2007 IJCL 402-403; 
Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 40-41, 74. 
80  Beyleveld Regulating Informal Trade in Johannesburg 7. 
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softened the impact of trade regulation in Johannesburg by increasing the 
opportunities for legal trade, the SAITF judgment has done little to guide the 
City towards adopting a more enabling regulatory framework that departs 
from the premise that livelihood-generating practices are generally 
legitimate and constitutive of human dignity.81 To the extent that this 
limitation of the judgment flows from the restrictive formulation of the right 
to choice of trade in the 1996 Constitution, subsequent case law suggests 
that reliance on the right to dignity in future litigation directed at challenging 
the criminalisation of essential livelihood strategies through the substance 
of trade regulations might bear more fruit. 
Moreover, much as the SAITF litigation has powerfully asserted traders' 
interests and forced the City to accommodate them, at least in the short 
term, this article has also shown that a resort to litigation may 
counterproductively impact on the future relationships between parties in 
situations (such as that in the present case) where they have to continue to 
interact with one another above and beyond the terms of an individual court 
order. In this respect the SAITF judgment appears at once to have 
enhanced the participatory clout of traders (in that it has forced the City to 
take their future demands more seriously) and to have undermined it (by 
hardening the local government's already unfavorable stance against street 
traders and by causing it to involve them in policy decisions affecting them 
only to the extent that is legally required to do so).82 It would also appear 
from the aftermath of SAITF that, where a regulatory margin of discretion is 
awarded, government officials are bound to persist with prior approaches to 
implementation to the extent that this is possible without actively 
transgressing the dictates of a judgment. 
Overall, the narrow, legal focus of the SAITF judgment predictably leaves 
many questions unanswered. In particular, the judgment sheds no light on 
the extent to which traders' rights to earn a livelihood (which enjoy only 
indirect protection under the Constitution) restrict the manner and extent to 
which cities may limit informal trade in the first place. More fundamentally, 
it at best fails to disturb and at worst insulates the manner in which the notion 
of legality itself contributes to the marginalisation and exclusion of 
vulnerable residents in South Africa's post-apartheid cities. While the 
directive that local government must adhere to the rule of law when pursuing 
urban management objectives was both to be expected and to be 
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